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Why Belgium Needs a Special Operations 
Command 
Alexander Mattelaer 
The setting up of a Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) constitutes a key 
element of the ongoing Belgian defence 
reforms. This Policy Brief aims to put 
the present demand for special 
operations forces in its historical context 
and engage in the discussion on how to 
structure and employ this special 
instrument of policy. Building on the 
legacy of the paracommando regiment, 
the future Belgian SOCOM constitutes a 
critical capability within an adaptive 
force structure. This new entity must be 
able to deliver results in a variety of 
unconventional missions that require 
high readiness, intellectual flexibility and 
maximum discretion or surprise. At the 
same time, special operations forces do 
not constitute a substitute for having a 
comprehensive security policy. They 
function best when used as force 
multipliers alongside other instruments 
of power towards joint effect. As the 
proverbial tip of the spear, they must 
lead the way for Belgian defence 
regeneration in general. 
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environment and defence establishments worn 
out by budget cuts, policy-makers across the 
continent are turning to their elite soldiers to 
save the day. Trained in all forms of 
unconventional warfare, special operations 
forces constitute a versatile tool for countering 
terrorism and training partners abroad. Across 
Europe strategic-level SOF-structures have 
boomed. A NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters was stood up in 2007, and a long 
list of European nations followed suit in 
establishing joint SOF entities, including, most 
recently, Denmark, Estonia, Norway and 
neutral Sweden. 
 
In this context, the setting-up of a Special 
Operations Command within the Belgian 
armed forces makes eminent sense. It allows 
the Ministry of Defence to upgrade the role 
and position of its Special Forces Group 
(SFG) and to make best use of its scarce 
resources by reorganising the paracommando 
units into a Special Forces Support Group 
(SFSG). As such, a SOCOM creates a single 
joint entity devoted to unconventional warfare 
in all its forms. In conceptual terms, this entity 
is meant to provide a maximum difference to 
the combined arms motorised capabilities and 
therefore constitutes a key element of the 
reorganisation of the force structure (Mattelaer 
No. 70 
 April 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Special operations forces (SOF) are in high 
demand. As Europe finds itself confronted 
with a rapidly deteriorating security 
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2015). The adoption of this proposal by the 
Belgian government as part of the Strategic Plan 
2030 therefore deserves applause. 
 
This Policy Brief seeks to put this decision 
into a broader context and to offer 
recommendations for guiding its subsequent 
implementation. The argument is organised 
into four parts. First, we explore the historical 
origins of special warfare and the early 
development of Belgian special operations 
forces. Second, we zoom in on the geopolitical 
environment and the increasing relevance of 
special operations forces as a strategic 
instrument therein. Third, we discuss what 
such a special operations command would 
look like and how it would relate to the overall 
structure of the Belgian armed forces. Fourth 
and finally, we offer an overview of the 
various scenarios in which Belgian special 
operations forces could be employed. This 
also includes a reflection on the proper 
mechanisms for politico-military control and 
oversight. Taken together, this Policy Brief 
makes the case for a commensurate Belgian 
contribution to the emerging global SOF 
network. In a context of increasing volatility 
both within the European continent and 
beyond, this special ability to act and shape the 
future is key. 
 
HISTORICAL ROOTS IN THE SPECIAL 
AIR SERVICE 
While the role of the hunter-warrior has 
existed throughout centuries, modern special 
operations – including the Belgian ones – find 
their origin in the conduct of the Second 
World War. At the insistence of Winston 
Churchill, the UK set up special Commando 
units for raiding the German-occupied coasts. 
It also created the Special Air Service (SAS) 
for launching parachute-enabled operations 
behind enemy lines. Critically, both 
organisations were organised to welcome 
volunteers from the occupied European 
 countries in their midst with a view to 
liberating the continent. It is in that context 
that the SAS D Parachute Company 2nd Battalion 
Belgian Fusiliers (later: 5th Squadron SAS 
Brigade) and the 4th Troop of the Nr 10 Inter-
Allied Commando were stood up in 1942. Ever 
since, the Belgian paracommando regiment 
constituted the intellectual home for preparing 
for unconventional warfare in all its forms. To 
the present day, the Belgian Special Forces 
Group fights under the SAS motto ‘Who 
Dares Wins’, which it inherited from 1 Para 
Battalion when the latter was disbanded in 
2010. 
 
These historical roots are important, as they 
serve to highlight a number of characteristics 
about the use of special operations in general. 
First comes their complementarity to conventional 
military operations. While it is tempting to think 
of contemporary special operations as stand-
alone endeavours, they have been historically 
developed as enablers for the wider military 
campaign (Mitchell 2014). From 1944 
onwards, Belgian parachute units were 
dropped behind enemy lines in France and 
Belgium to collect intelligence and to disrupt 
the German defences. As part of the 
operations Noah and Brutus in August 1944 
Belgian SAS volunteers were the very first 
Allied troops to enter into occupied Belgian 
territory and link up with various resistance 
groups. While special operations forces can 
work independently, they function best when 
supporting a broader campaign plan and 
comprehensive inter-agency effort (cf. Lamb 
2014). 
 
Second, special operations constitute an 
instrument for times of great need and 
therefore require an inherent readiness to assume 
risk. As one could expect, many volunteers 
gave their lives in the airborne raids of 1944-
1945. But also afterwards, the paracommando 
units were on permanent standby for high-risk 
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operations. The illustrious evacuation 
operations in the aftermath of Congolese 
independence constitute a clear example. In 
1964, for instance, Belgian paracommandos 
fought their way through the communist 
Simba rebellion in Kisangani and liberated 
some 1,800 Belgian and other Western 
hostages (Operation Red Dragon, see Quanten 
2014). This willingness to assume risk 
continued in the post-Cold War era, as the 
paracommandos were the first to be deployed 
to UN peacekeeping operations. In Somalia 
they were tasked to ensure that the port of 
Kismayo remained open for humanitarian 
supplies in a fiercely contested environment. In 
1994, ten paracommandos serving in the UN 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda paid the 
highest price when trying to prevent the 
assassination of Rwandan Prime Minister 
Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana. While the 
employment of SOF is often high-risk, they 
undeniably constitute a strategic instrument in 
support of Belgium’s international influence. 
However,  like any such instrument, they 
require careful attention and political 
calibration. 
 
Third, the engagement of special operations 
forces often involves deep multinational cooperation, 
based on trust as well as common operating 
procedures. Not only do the Belgian special 
operations forces find their origin in the 
Second World War: the same is the case for 
their Dutch, French, Norwegian and Australian 
counterparts. The close ties between all these 
forces and the US Office of Strategic Services 
constitute the historical roots of today’s 
NATO SOF community. Even the larger 
evacuation operations typically involve close 
multinational cooperation: Operation Red Dragon 
may have been executed by Belgian 
paracommandos, but they were airlifted and 
dropped into theatre by American C-130s. This 
multinational dimension is also very much in 
the contemporary spotlight, as both the United 
States and various like-minded nations are 
building up a global SOF network geared 
towards cooperative security solutions (cf. 
McRaven 2013). 
THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
Experts will point out that special operations 
have evolved enormously since their early 
origins. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, 
the special operations community has led the 
way towards notable counterterrorism 
successes as well as a wider renaissance in 
unconventional warfare (Thomas and 
Dougherty 2013). On the one hand, this 
entailed a revolutionary fusion of special 
operations and intelligence work for 
neutralising violent extremist networks. On the 
other hand, it implied the pursuit of indirect 
approaches geared towards building the 
security capacity of local partners. Yet the 
spectacular successes achieved in the field have 
not gone unnoticed. In eastern Europe, Russia 
is in the process of exploring new forms of 
hybrid and ambiguous warfare – using its own 
‘little green men’ – in response to what it 
perceives as the increasing use of information 
warfare and special operations forces 
(Gerasimov 2016). Following the recent 
terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, 
European SOF are increasingly called upon in 
a domestic counterterrorism context. As 
military competition in and around Europe 
evolves further, the importance of SOF 
therefore continues to increase. 
 
In contemporary NATO doctrine, special 
operations forces serve three principal tasks. 
First, they can be used for special reconnaissance. 
Across the full range of operations, SOF 
provide military commanders and political 
decision-makers with discreet or covert 
situational awareness within any given theatre. 
Second, they can be used for executing direct 
action against specific targets or for achieving 
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specific objectives. Such missions can range 
from hostage rescue and evacuation missions to 
sabotage and counterterrorism raids. Thirdly, 
they can be used for a wide range of military 
assistance duties. This includes the training and 
mentoring of local security forces. As such, 
military assistance constitutes a continuum that 
ranges from the special to the conventional. All 
three tasks are executed by small teams of highly 
trained operators. These are often supported by 
extensive intelligence links, civil affairs specialists 
and commando units, all tailored to meet what 
the specific mission requires. Also, they rely on 
state-of-the-art equipment, especially with 
regards to secure communication links. 
 
In recent years, the Belgian Special Forces 
Group and paracommando battalions have 
engaged in all three of these tasks. While open-
source operational details are scarce, a few 
examples help illustrate their use. In 2008, 
Belgium deployed its special forces to eastern 
Chad to ensure a proper intelligence picture for 
the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. For several 
months, it provided the combined joint special 
operations component command within the 
mission (Clerix 2009). In 2010, a team of special 
forces was sent to the Ivory Coast with the task 
of protecting the Belgian embassy (Knack 2010). 
At the time, heavy fighting was taking place in 
Abidjan and all borders and airspace were 
officially closed, thus requiring a covert insertion 
operation as well as the potential exfiltration of 
embassy personnel. In 2015, Belgian special 
operators trained together with their 
counterparts from over 20 Allied and various 
African countries as part of the US AFRICOM-
led Operation Flintlock. In addition, the extensive 
training that the paracommando units have 
provided to the rapid reaction units of the 
Congolese armed forces is well known. In 2009, 
3 Para Battalion provided the first instructors for 
the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 
that Belgium contributed to the NATO mission 
in Afghanistan. Last but not least, valuable 
experience was acquired by posting staff 
officers in multinational headquarters, such as 
the NATO Special Operations Component 
Command-Afghanistan (Van den Bogaert 
2013). 
 
As irregular warfare becomes more prevalent, 
the relevance of special operations forces is 
rapidly increasing. While they cannot serve as a 
substitute for conventional military force, they 
are especially adept at working through and 
with local state and non-state partners. This 
makes them an attractive tool that provides a 
proverbial bridge between diplomatic action 
and full-blown military operations (cf. Bilo and 
Weuts 2013; Madden et al. 2016). Whether it is 
in the ongoing struggle against violent 
extremism in Europe’s southern 
neighbourhood, or in the ambiguous Russian 
campaign for geopolitical influence in 
Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, special 
operations forces are proving ever more to be 
indispensible. If they are well trained and 
carefully employed by leaders who understand 
their strengths and weaknesses, they can offer 
a high return on investment. 
 
While one can only speculate about the future, 
there is little reason to believe that these recent 
trends are about to turn around. As the 
struggle to secure Europe’s easternmost and 
southernmost border regions intensifies, the 
future roles of special operations forces are set 
to widen. The emergence of anti-access and 
area-denial bubbles covering swathes of 
European territory constitutes a particular 
point of concern, as they complicate a swift 
reinforcement of Europe’s eastern flank. The 
hypothetical disruption of such networks, as 
well as the countering of Spetsnaz infiltration, 
could become a critical mission if scenarios 
similar to that in eastern Ukraine were to 
unfold within EU member states. At the same 
time, the growing needs for security assistance 
across North Africa and beyond are not hard 
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to fathom. On both geographical flanks, 
unconventional low-signature capabilities will be 
needed in greater numbers. The most troubling 
scenario, however, undoubtedly concerns the 
potential emergence of a terrorist insurgency 
that stretches Belgian domestic law enforcement 
beyond breaking point. The suicide bombings at 
Brussels airport and Maalbeek metro station in 
March 2016 constitute a stark reminder that this 
nightmare scenario cannot be wished away. The 
question remains: what should a Belgian 
contribution to a global SOF network look like? 
 
HOW TO STRUCTURE A BELGIAN 
SOCOM 
It is received wisdom that having a dedicated 
national special operations structure is a critical 
ingredient for optimising the use of SOF (NSCC 
2008). At the same time, various models are 
available as to how this can be put into practice 
(cf. Gehem 2015, Kristoffersen 2015, Mitchell 
2008). The key challenge is therefore to design a 
structure that provides the appropriate and 
necessary stewardship within the national 
defence establishment. For Belgium, this would 
suggest the setting up of a two-star command 
overseeing the education, training and tactical 
engagement of the Special Forces Group and 
the future Special Forces Support Group. It 
would also provide a dedicated joint entity for 
plugging in various enablers and aviation assets 
required for special operations. Such a SOCOM 
would report directly to the Assistant Chief of 
Staff responsible for Operations and Training, 
and constitute a single focal point for the 
politico-military interface on all SOF-related 
matters. At the same time, the different service 
component commands remain administratively 
responsible for the different members of the 
SOF community so as to keep the SOCOM as 
lean and agile as any command structure can be. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: SOCOM command and control 
 
Setting up a special operations command led 
by an experienced flag officer constitutes the 
best mechanism for overseeing the 
development of these forces. This goes beyond 
the provision of unified direction at the 
operational and tactical level. It also includes a 
more strategic role in terms of advising the 
defence leadership on the role of special 
operations and establishing resource 
requirements. Such a structure needs to remain 
light and nimble to serve as command element 
for national special operations and immediate 
reaction tasks. Yet it must also be sufficiently 
substantial to contribute to a composite special 
operations component command. For meeting 
the latter capability shortfall Belgium could 
team up with partners such as the Netherlands 
and Denmark, or with France (as in Chad). 
This means that the SOCOM emerges as the 
hub for nurturing a community of SOF-savvy 
staff officers and non-commissioned officers. 
At the same time, the service components 
remain the resource providers and ultimate 
stakeholders of all national capabilities, 
including SOF. Building on best practices as 
learned in other countries of similar size such 
as Norway, the service components play a key 
role in terms of supporting processes (such as 
personnel matters and career development) so  
that the SOCOM can focus to the maximum 
on its operational tasks. The different 
component commands and the SCOM will 
 
component commands and the SOCOM will 
therefore have to work hand-in-glove to make 
this into a joint success. 
forces is a prudent hedge to mitigate negative 
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  therefore have to work hand-in-glove to make 
this into a joint success. 
 
The Special Forces Group (SFG) will form the 
elite unit of the wider SOF community. 
Following the decisions of the government 
with regards to the Strategic Plan 2030, the 
Special Forces Group will be expanded 
numerically to some 225 full-time equivalents. 
It will organised around a staff element for 
commanding the most sensitive operations 
through a dedicated Task Group Headquarters, 
different troops of operator teams, support 
personnel and instructors.  With their land, sea 
and air insertion skills and their ability to 
operate in all environments, they are capable of 
performing the full spectrum of SOF 
operations. Rigorously selected and trained to 
the highest standards, SFG operators are 
prepared to cope with whatever challenges the 
future security environment may bring. As 
such, the Special Forces Group remains the top 
tier of Belgian special operations capability and 
is set to grow significantly in the years ahead. 
As far as administrative support is concerned, a 
special arrangement should be envisaged for 
ensuring the SFG is treated as truly joint entity. 
 
The Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) will 
constitute a new unit modelled on the British 
equivalent with which it shares the name. It will 
act as a quick reaction force for SFG 
operations and provide the immediate reaction 
capability for larger operations. For the former 
role, it must be capable of ‘take-and-hold’ tasks, 
secondary assaults and diversionary raids 
alongside SFG operators. As such, it also 
provides a wider force pool for training and 
mentoring foreign militaries – arguably the 
SOF task in highest demand. For the latter role, 
it needs to be able to rapidly project multiple 
companies into contested environments, 
making full use of strategic surprise effects so 
as to enable follow-on forces to arrive. It bears 
emphasis that this is as applicable to an eastern 
European context as it is to central Africa (cf. 
Hooker 2015). For this reason, it is imperative 
that the SFSG reassembles all the existing 
paracommando companies and their enablers. 
Between the SFG and the SFSGs there exists a 
symbiotic relationship. Not only do the 
paracommandos constitute the primary 
recruitment pool of the SFG, but the SOCOM 
can also build on the strong commonalities of 
SFG and SFSG operations in terms of 
readiness requirements, command and control, 
and materiel. In terms of its organisation, the 
SFSG can be structured around companies 
specialised in different missions and operating 
environments (see Bilo and Weuts 2013). In 
practice, this would mean two companies for 
counterterrorism, urban and desert operations, 
two companies for amphibious and cold 
weather operations, plus two support 
companies including snipers, mortars, 
engineering and joint fire combat support. Such 
an unconventional structure also serves to 
underscore that the SFSG should not be used 
as a substitute force pool for taking on 
conventional tasks. 
 
Special operations require more than just 
shooters and bayonets; they are critically 
dependent on enablers. Special forces aviation 
constitutes a case in point. As the Belgian Air 
Force is set to retire its C-130 Hercules 
transport aircraft in the years ahead, the need 
for tactical mobility complementary to the new 
Airbus A400M fleet is set to grow significantly. 
A small number of dedicated special aviation 
assets would offset this capability gap. One 
cost-effective option in the near term would be 
to earmark the existing NH90 tactical transport 
helicopters for such a purpose, the rotary wing 
capability being particularly suited for direct 
action. Short take-off and landing aircraft 
would provide a new capability that is 
extraordinarily useful for missions in remote 
areas. Equally important, however, is that the 
SOCOM can make full use of supporting 
networks in terms of psychological operations, 
civil affairs and intelligence links. Specialised 
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medical support and cooperation with naval 
forces is also required. Successful special 
operations are ultimately driven by a long 
process of mission analysis, intelligence fusion 
and joint planning (cf. Madden et al. 2016). Any 
special operations command must therefore 
develop and maintain strong relationships with 
all parts of the defence establishment. This 
requires both continuous effort and adequate 
staff resources.  
 
A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS 
AND EXERCISING CONTROL 
A dedicated command must provide centralised 
stewardship for the entire national SOF 
community and advise the defence leadership 
on the use thereof. Only an officer of flag rank 
can provide the necessary stature and exercise 
the required influence in the budgeting process 
to turn this into reality. But if special operations 
are meant to serve policy, the question remains 
what is the appropriate corollary in terms of 
political guidance and oversight. This section 
therefore considers the various employment 
scenarios under which special operations forces 
could serve the Belgian population. 
 
As a founding member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation and the European Union, 
Belgium’s security policy is primarily geared 
towards making a proportional contribution to 
these organisations. This not only includes 
participating in collective security operations, 
but also (and more importantly) the latent 
ability to ensure the collective defence of all 
members. The ensuing quest for military 
readiness includes the development of special 
operations forces that are well trained for the 
tasks of special reconnaissance, direct action 
and military assistance. It would also be highly 
desirable for Belgium to contribute staff 
personnel to the NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters and other structures in order to 
stay plugged into the global SOF network on a 
permanent basis. Within the European External 
Action Service, the position of the Special 
 Operations Adviser must be reinforced. 
 
Yet apart from these three tasks, the Belgian 
SOCOM would have a wider remit for meeting 
strictly national requirements. One core task is 
to protect Belgian citizens abroad and to 
conduct hostage rescue and non-combatant 
evacuation operations when required. While the 
character of this task may have changed as a 
result of the shrinking size of the Belgian 
community in Central Africa, its fundamental 
nature has not. In case of dire need, citizens 
can and will expect their government to rescue 
and protect them. Recent attacks on Western 
tourists in holiday resorts prove that such 
scenarios are anything but fantasy. The ability 
to react professionally – by generating an 
immediate response, ensuring proper 
information security and exploiting strategic 
surprise – therefore remains of paramount 
importance. Such future operations may well 
unfold in urban terrain and contested 
environments. The SOCOM should therefore 
prepare accordingly by sizing the Special Forces 
Support Group for operating above company-
level. Precisely because Belgian forces are likely 
to find themselves outnumbered in such 
scenarios, they must mentally gear themselves 
for a distinctly unconventional fight.  
 
Another debate concerns the use of special 
operations forces for homeland security and 
counterterrorism operations. The infamous 
‘Brussels lockdown’ in November 2015 drove 
home the message that domestic security forces 
are easily overwhelmed when facing the risk of 
multiple and simultaneous incidents. Yet it 
cannot be the duty of Belgian military 
personnel to cater for domestic security 
permanently. This runs counter to the decision 
to demilitarise the gendarmerie in the 1990s and 
the corresponding transfer of financial 
resources from the Ministry of Defence to the 
Ministry of the Interior. While military forces 
can be made available on an exceptional basis – 
in case of force majeure – the aim must be to 
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  transfer domestic security roles back to the 
federal and local police as soon as possible. It is 
precisely in this context that special operations 
forces can play a meaningful role. Their discrete 
and intelligence-led employment can be geared 
towards regaining the initiative over potential 
terrorist networks, so that static guarding duties 
and large-scale reactive lockdowns – with 
enormous cost to the economy – are not 
required. In order to be properly prepared to 
act in such an interagency context, special 
operations forces need to be able to work hand 
in glove with the federal police and other 
national security actors such as the Ministry of 
Justice and intelligence agencies. 
 
The employment of special operations forces 
requires careful political deliberation and 
democratic control, both in multinational 
operations and even more so in a domestic 
context. For that reason it is important to be 
clear about decision-making procedures and 
civilian oversight. Like all other military 
operations, the use of special operations would 
need to be authorised by the government in its 
nucleus format (the so-called kern), involving 
the prime minister, vice prime ministers and 
ministers of foreign affairs and defence. Given 
their sensitive nature, it is imperative that the 
need-to-know circle is kept as small as possible. 
At the same time, the Belgian parliament will 
want to exercise its role of oversight. For this 
purpose, it would be advisable to set up a 
restricted format of the defence committee to 
review special operations retrospectively and on 
a strictly confidential basis. In that sense, 
setting up the SOCOM would provide political 
leaders with more direct control and the duty to 
exercise this control with the required sense of 
responsibility and discretion.  
 
CONCLUSION: WHO DARES WINS 
Defence planning is about looking far ahead, 
for it takes many years to develop or regenerate 
capabilities. Establishing a Belgian SOCOM 
provides a mechanism to retain and transform 
the longstanding legacy of the paracommando 
regiment and to grow and nurture that special 
set of forces that are in highest demand. Their 
usefulness and contemporary relevance stands 
beyond question. Both in NATO and EU 
contexts these forces of the highest readiness 
constitute a capability shortfall. In addition, 
they meet a critical requirement for purely 
national reasons, ranging from non-combatant 
evacuation to domestic counterterrorism in 
extraordinary circumstances. The Special 
Forces Group and paracommando units 
together form one of the crown jewels of the 
Belgian defence establishment. Putting them 
under a single, unified structure is about 
keeping up with international best practices and 
fostering that capability with the highest return 
on investment in a context of austerity. 
 
A dedicated SOCOM would provide the 
necessary stewardship to the military 
community specialised in thinking 
unconventionally about defending Belgian 
interests and values wherever they come under 
threat. At a time when the Belgian armed forces 
are witnessing a dramatic transformation in 
terms of personnel numbers and equipment 
modernisation, this is exactly the capability set 
that is needed the most. The present Strategic 
Plan 2030 puts forward a commendable 
argument for reversing the decline of the 
Belgian military level of ambition and providing 
the next generation with the necessary tools to 
ensure their security. Yet for several years to 
come, the Belgian defence establishment will 
continue to downsize as a result of a coming 
retirement wave amongst military personnel. 
This means that genuine regeneration of the 
force will only materialise in the late 2020s and 
beyond. This scenario carries significant risks. 
Consolidating and expanding special operations 
forces is a prudent hedge to mitigate negative 
surprises in the coming ten years and have at 
least one versatile instrument to cope with 
these risks if they materialise. 
 
In the longer run, however, the trend of 
downsizing the armed forces cannot continue. 
Special operations forces cannot substitute for 
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In the longer run, however, the trend of 
downsizing the armed forces cannot continue. 
Special operations forces cannot substitute for 
the numbers that only conventional forces can 
provide. Providing wide area security on land, 
securing lines of communication at sea, or 
controlling airspace: those are critical tasks that 
only conventional forces in sufficient quantities 
can accomplish. In terms of sheer numbers, the 
Strategic Plan 2030 still eyes a force structure that 
falls significantly short of the Strategic Plan 2015 
that was approved in the more benevolent 
security of 2003: 34 fighter and 7 cargo aircraft 
instead of 90 and 11, respectively; 2 frigates and 
6 mine-hunters instead of 3 and 7; and, most 
importantly, a single brigade plus special 
operations forces instead of two mechanised 
brigades and one paracommando brigade. 
Upgrading special operations forces can help 
offset some of the drawbacks of a smaller force, 
but in order to remain ‘special’, they do need to 
constitute a selected elite. The draining of the 
total force pool also saps the defence 
establishment of the possibility to recruit and 
train special operations forces. A SOCOM 
structure is therefore an essential but ultimately 
insufficient mechanism to cope with an 
environment in which security risks proliferate 
and come closer to home. Yet in the face of 
such risks, it is the unconventional mentality that 
one needs the most: who dares wins! 
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